9 3 3 a r t I C l e S Resources are rarely distributed uniformly in the environment. Food, water and other vital commodities more often occur in spatially localized and temporally ephemeral patches 1 . Patchy environments force animals to balance the benefits of staying in a depleting patch and leaving for a richer one 2 . According to the marginal value theorem (MVT) of behavioral ecology, animals should leave patches when their intake rate diminishes to the average intake rate for the overall environment 2,3 . Organisms as diverse as worms, bees, wasps, spiders, fish, birds, seals and even plants obey the MVT 3-6 . Ethnographic evidence demonstrates that human subsistence foragers also obey the predictions of the MVT in their hunting behavior 7 , and laboratory findings suggest that monkeys may do so as well 8 . The generality of the MVT solution to the patch-leaving problem suggests that the underlying mechanism is fundamental to the way organisms make decisions 4 . The neuronal basis of patch-leaving decisions, however, remains unknown.
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Resources are rarely distributed uniformly in the environment. Food, water and other vital commodities more often occur in spatially localized and temporally ephemeral patches 1 . Patchy environments force animals to balance the benefits of staying in a depleting patch and leaving for a richer one 2 . According to the marginal value theorem (MVT) of behavioral ecology, animals should leave patches when their intake rate diminishes to the average intake rate for the overall environment 2, 3 . Organisms as diverse as worms, bees, wasps, spiders, fish, birds, seals and even plants obey the MVT [3] [4] [5] [6] . Ethnographic evidence demonstrates that human subsistence foragers also obey the predictions of the MVT in their hunting behavior 7 , and laboratory findings suggest that monkeys may do so as well 8 . The generality of the MVT solution to the patch-leaving problem suggests that the underlying mechanism is fundamental to the way organisms make decisions 4 . The neuronal basis of patch-leaving decisions, however, remains unknown.
Building on recent progress toward understanding the neuronal mechanisms mediating perceptual decisions 9 , we hypothesized that the brain maintains a decision variable specifying the current relative value of leaving a patch. Conceptually, a decision variable is an analog quantity that incorporates all sources of information-in this case, reward size, handling time, search time and travel time-evaluated by the decision policy to generate a behavioral choice 9 . The hypothesized decision variable gives rise to a decision via comparison with a specific threshold. For simplicity, we assume that this process is analogous, although not necessarily isomorphic, to the neural integrateto-threshold processes thought to mediate perceptual judgments [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . We further conjecture that travel time between patches influences leaving decisions by changing the rate at which the decision variable grows, the threshold or both 10, 11 .
To test these hypotheses, we developed a virtual foraging task in which rhesus monkeys chose one of two targets. One target corresponded to remaining in the patch, and choosing it yielded a juice reward that declined each time it was chosen. The other target corresponded to leaving the patch, and choosing it yielded only a delay before the opportunity to choose again at a replenished patch. Monkeys' behavior closely matched the predictions of the MVT. We then recorded activity of neurons in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) while they performed the task.
dACC has been linked to reward outcome monitoring and behavioral adjustment [14] [15] [16] , as well as to signaling reward outcomes and predicting changes in behavior [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Notably, ACC dysfunction attends clinical disorders that are associated with difficulty in abandoning maladaptive patterns of behavior or cognition, including depression, addiction, obsessive-compulsive disorder and Tourette Syndrome [25] [26] [27] .
We found that dACC neurons responded each time monkeys made a choice and that these responses increased with time spent in the current patch. Monkeys abandoned a patch when neuronal responses reached a threshold associated with a particular travel time. When travel time between patches was high, the gain of neuronal responses with each decision to remain in the patch was smaller and the threshold for patch abandonment was higher than when travel time was short. Overall, neuronal response gain and threshold jointly predicted patch-leaving decisions. These findings suggest that dACC mediates patch-leaving decisions using a common integrate-to-threshold mechanism.
RESULTS
For each choice there were two options (Fig. 1a) . Choosing the stay (short blue) target led to a juice reward in 0.4 s (handling time). The value of this reward declined by 19 µl ± ε (s.e.m., ε = 1.9 µl) each time it was chosen, mirroring the diminishing returns common to patchy foraging environments (Fig. 1b) . Choosing the leave (tall gray) target led to no reward and a long delay that was fixed in a patch and varied 9 3 4 VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 7 | JULY 2011 nature neurOSCIenCe a r t I C l e S between patches, and reset the value of the stay target to its initial high value (306 µl). We defined search time as any additional time spent in the patch not explicitly waiting and residence time as total time from arrival at a new patch, including handling times, search time and intertrial intervals (ITIs). Travel time was explicitly cued on all trials by the height of the gray bar and was reset to a new random value each time it was chosen (0.5 to 10.5 s, uniform distribution). The blue and gray bars alternated sides each time the leave target was chosen; any potential laterality in neural tuning functions was assumed to average out (Supplementary Data 1) . In contrast to some natural foraging decisions, there was no physical travel during the travel time, nor was any action required during this delay; the only explicit cost of delay was opportunity cost. These simplifications are, we believe, not critical, as most other laboratory foraging tasks eschew effort requirements (for example, see refs. 8,28).
Monkeys approximate rate maximization according to MVT As travel time between patches grows, so does the rate-maximizing residence time (Fig. 1c) . Consistent with the MVT, monkeys' patchresidence times rose with increasing travel time and were nearly rate maximizing (P < 0.0001, β = 1.247, regression of residence time (s) against travel time (s); Fig. 2a) . These effects were found in both monkeys individually (P < 0.0001 for both individuals, β = 1.11 for monkey E, β = 1.47 for monkey O; Supplementary Data 2 and Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Overall, both monkeys obtained 97.2% of the reward obtained by the best-fit rate-maximization algorithm (note that this is a measure of reward obtained versus maximal obtainable, not a measure of variance in behavior explained). Both monkeys remained in patches slightly longer than predicted by the MVT (mean 2.2 s longer, P < 0.01, Student's t test). This slight over-staying may reflect a weak preference for immediate small rewards over delayed large rewards [29] [30] [31] , a slight over-estimate of travel times or even a status quo bias 32 . Leaving time was not influenced by travel time on the previous patch (regression of residence time against previous travel time, P = 0.44; Supplementary Data 3 and Supplementary Fig. 2) .
Monkeys attempting to maximize local intake rates over the longterm should consider handling time as well as travel time 2, 3 . To confirm that monkeys do so, we performed an additional behavioral experiment in which handling times, but not travel times, were varied from patch to patch (11 sessions, 6 in monkey E, 5 in monkey O). In each patch, handling time took one of ten values: 0.1, 0.4 , 0.6, 1.1, 1.6, 2.1, 2.6, 3.1, 3.6 or 4.1 s. We cued handling time by varying the height of the blue rectangle; travel time was held constant at 5 s. We performed these experiments after the monkeys had learned the task, but before we began physiological data collection; monkeys received one full day of training each. As predicted, patch residence times declined with increased handling time (regression, β = −3.71 for both, −3.81 for E and −3.62 for O, P < 0.001 in all cases; Fig. 2b ). Leaving times did not differ systematically from the rate-maximizing predictions at any of the ten points (P > 0.05 in all cases, Student's t test). As an additional control, during these sessions, we interleaved standard fixed handling time patches with variable travel times. The average residence time on these trials was consistent with those obtained in the handling time control (Fig. 2b) .
A natural question is whether the monkeys' foraging behavior may be explained in a delay-discounting framework 30, 33 . In such a framework, each leave/stay decision is regarded as a choice between a smaller-sooner stay reward and larger-later leave reward (that is, the first reward in the new patch). Such a decision model would naturally account for the monkeys' observed tendency to stay longer in patches when faced with longer travel times, as the delay associated with patch-leaving would lead to discounting of the larger-later reward. To test this idea, we compared an empirically derived sequential foraging model inspired by the MVT against a standard delaydiscounting model in which the hyperbolic discount parameter k 
Neurons integrate information over multiple actions
We recorded the activity of 102 single neurons in dACC in two monkeys performing this task (52 neurons in monkey E, 50 in monkey O; Fig. 3 ). For an example neuron, neural activity was aligned to the end of the choice saccade (time zero; Fig. 3a ). Firing rate rose to a peak around the time of the choice saccade and then returned to a baseline value between trials. Such brief, peri-saccadic responses, often modulated by reward size and task context, are characteristic of neurons in dACC 18, 21, 22, 24 . We focused on neuronal activity in the 500-ms epoch preceding saccade onset (pre-saccadic epoch). For most analyses, we focused on neural data associated with choosing to remain in the patch and excluded neural data associated with choosing to leave the patch (exceptions are noted). Data for individual subjects matched the combined data (Supplementary Data 5 and Supplementary Fig. 4) . We next examined the responses of the example neuron from four time periods relative to the beginning of foraging in the patch (t < 7.5 s, 7.5 < t < 15, 15 < t < 22.5, and 22.5 < t; Fig. 3b) . For this neuron, responses rose with cumulative time spent foraging in the patch. To quantify this enhancement, we measured pre-saccadic responses in a series of non-overlapping 5-s time bins (Fig. 3c) . We included in each time bin all of the decisions in which the end of the saccade occurred in that bin. We found that firing rates rose with increasing patch residence time (β = 0.31, P < 0.0001, linear regression of firing rate (spikes per s) against time in patch (s)). The same effects were observed in the population average firing rates (β = 0.18, P < 0.0001, regression; Fig. 3d, Supplementary Data 6 and Supplementary Fig. 5 ). We observed a significant (P < 0.05) positive regression coefficient in 49 neurons (average β = 0.24 in significantly modulated cells), a significant negative slope in 10 (average β = −0.09) and no significant slope in the remainder (P > 0.05, n = 43, average β = 0.041). The 49 neurons with positive slopes constitute the focus of subsequent analyses (Supplementary Data 7 and Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7) .
We next performed the same analysis on two later epochs. In the post-saccadic epoch, we measured firing rates during the 400-ms handling time period beginning at saccade termination and ending with the reward. In the ITI epoch, we measured firing rates during the 1-s period beginning after reward delivery and ending when the next set of choice options was presented to the monkey. For the post-saccadic epoch, we observed a positive regression coefficient in 44 neurons (P < 0.05, average β = 0.15 in significantly modulated cells), a negative coefficient in 8 (average β = −0.1), and no significant effect in the remainder (P > 0.05, 50 neurons, average β = 0.010). Nor was there much evidence of an effect in the ITI epoch at the population level; we observed a significant correlation between firing rates in the ITI and patch residence time in only four neurons (average β = 0.02), all positive in sign. These numbers are similar to what would be expected by chance (Supplementary Data 8) . This result suggests that dACC does not maintain a representation of time spent foraging in a patch across multiple actions; the locus of this trace in the brain remains to be determined. Overall, we observed weak or no effect of saccade direction on responses (Supplementary Data 1) .
Threshold-crossing of dACC firing predicts patch-leaving
The gradual rise in neural responses across decisions to stay in a patch resembles the within-trial rise-to-threshold processes observed in lateral intraparietal area, frontal eye fields (FEFs) and superior colliculus during motor preparation and decision-making [10] [11] [12] 34, 35 . We wondered whether a similar rise-to-threshold model might also account for the relationship between firing rates in dACC and patch-leaving decisions. To test this idea, we performed an analysis modeled on a previously developed method 11 for probing the relationship between the firing rates of FEF neurons and saccade initiation. Although FEF firing rates in that study 11 rose gradually to a fixed threshold on a single trial, the analogous rise in our study a r t I C l e S was associated with changes in firing rate occurring in discrete bouts over multiple actions. Moreover, firing rates of FEF neurons gradually rise to threshold over tens of milliseconds, whereas the amplitudes of discrete dACC neuronal responses in our task increased over tens of seconds, orders of magnitude longer. Nonetheless, these analytical methods in principle generalize readily to our task. Our analysis asked two questions. First, does variability in patch-leaving times correlate with variability in the rate at which neural activity rises? Second, do firing rates rise to the same level regardless of the precise time monkeys choose to leave the patch for a given travel time?
We first divided all patch-leaving choices into residence time quartiles in each travel time (medians of each set for the aggregate response, earliest = 14.1 s, early = 19.2 s, late = 23.5 s, latest = 32.2 s; Fig. 4a) . We refer to this classification of trials as the 'earliness' for each patch. We repeated the classification of leaving times into four different earliness bins for each neuron separately. By design, earliness is orthogonal to travel time, and so neural correlates of earliness and travel time are independent. For our example neuron, firing rates were significantly higher for the earliest than for the early patches (difference = 1.8 spikes per s, P = 0.02; Fig. 4b) , significantly higher for the early than for the late patches (difference = 2.0 spikes per s, P < 0.01) and significantly higher for the late than for the latest patches (difference = 4.7 spikes per s, P < 0.01).
We next calculated the average neural responses in a series of 5-s time bins encompassing multiple choices separated by earliness level. For both the example neuron and the focal population of neurons (n = 49 of 102, see above), we found that the rate of rise of firing rates was positively correlated with earliness (Fig. 4c,d) . We quantified these effects by calculating the regression weight for firing rate as a function of patch residence time separately for each of the four earliness bins. The slope for the earliest patches (β = 0.71) was greater than the slope for the early patches (β = 0.52, P < 0.01, bootstrap test), which was greater than the slope for the late patches (β = 0.44, P < 0.01), which was in turn greater than the slope for the latest patches (β = 0.39, P < 0.01). The same effects were observed in the population average responses (P < 0.005 for each comparison). Slopes decreased monotonically from earliest to latest quartiles for 32 of 49 neurons (65%). The remainder (n = 17) showed no such effect.
We then examined whether firing rates rose to the same threshold in each of the four earliness bins. For this analysis, we only examined firing rates for patch-leaving choices, which we had ignored in previous analyses. We took these firing rates to be a proxy for the patch-leaving threshold. Firing rates did not depend on earliness for the example neuron (regression of firing rate against earliness level, P = 0.45; Fig. 4c ) or the population (P = 0.88; Fig. 4d) , which is consistent with the threshold hypothesis. We observed no relationship between earliness and threshold for the population average response (regression, P = 0.79). We observed a significant effect of earliness on threshold for only a small number of cells, 6 out of 49 significantly modulated neurons (12.2%, P < 0.05). Finally, we found that neuronal responses aligned to the patch-leaving trial for different earliness levels overlapped (Fig. 4e) . For the population of neurons, firing rates rose to approximately the same level on the last decision to stay in the patch before choosing to leave the patch (regression, β = −0.003, P = 0.51).
Travel time influences gain and threshold of neuronal responses
Assuming that patch-leaving decisions are governed by a threshold process, variation in travel times should influence the threshold. There are three basic mechanisms by which travel time could influence the accumulation-to-threshold process (Fig. 5a) . First, travel time could increase the rate of rise of the decision variable. Second, travel time could adjust the threshold level. Third, travel time could influence the baseline. Our next analysis was designed to determine which of these processes are implemented in dACC.
We first examined the relationship between travel time and response gain (Fig. 5b,c) . For each neuron, we divided patches into ten travel time deciles (equal-sized sequentially classified bins, 1 to 10 ± 0.5 s). In each decile, we calculated the slope of firing rate versus time in patch. We found a significant negative correlation between travel time and regression slope for our example neuron (regression, β = −0.04, P < 0.01; Fig. 5b ) and for the 49 cells in the analysis population (β = −0.033, P < 0.01; Fig. 5c ). We observed significant negative effects in 29 of 49 of the focal population of neurons, positive correlations in 6, and no effect in 14 (P < 0.05). Across the entire population, we found a significant negative correlation in 41 of 102 neurons (P > 0.05), a positive correlation in 7 neurons and no effect in 54 neurons. 
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We next examined the relationship between travel time and threshold (Fig. 5d,e) . As above, we assumed that the firing rate in the epoch immediately preceding patch-leaving provides a proxy for threshold. For our example neuron, the threshold rose with travel time (β = 1.53, P < 0.01, regression of firing rates (spikes per s) against travel time (s); Fig. 5d ). There was also a significant, but weaker, correlation between travel time and firing rate on the last choice to stay in the patch before patch-leaving, consistent with the idea of a gradual rise-to-threshold process (β = 1.32, P < 0.025); the whole population showed similar effects (Fig. 5e) . For the focal population (n = 49), threshold rose with travel time (β = 0.92, P < 0.01), as did previous-trial responses (β = 0.69, P < 0.001). We observed a rise in threshold in 37 of 102 neurons (regression, P < 0.05, a negative effect in one neuron, no effect in the rest).
If travel time influences threshold levels, do thresholds actually remain constant for different leaving times, after accounting for travel time? To answer this question, we measured neural responses on patch-leaving trials in five groups of travel times (0.5 to 2.5, 2.5 to 4.5, 4.5 to 6.5, 6.5 to 8.5 and 8.5 to 10.5 s). Two facts suggest that they were constant across earliness level (see above) after accounting for travel time. First, in each of these travel time groups, earliness did not influence firing rate in the pre-saccadic epoch of the patch-leaving trial (P > 0.2 in all cases). Second, there was no significant interaction between earliness and travel time (P = 0.67, two-way ANOVA, four levels of earliness and five travel times, main effect of earliness = 0.06 spikes per s per bin).
Finally, we considered whether travel times influence baseline firing. We reasoned that such an effect would be most apparent on the first few choices in a new patch. We found no effects of travel time on firing rate responses occurring in the first 5 s of a patch (ANOVA of normalized firing rate against travel time, P = 0.41) and a significant effect in nine neurons individually (P < 0.05). The frequency of these effects is not much more than would be expected by chance (n = 5.1 neurons, P = 0.067, binomial test), and the size of the effect was weak (average difference between 1-and 10-s travel times was 0.09 spikes per s). Moreover, of these nine neurons, six showed increasing firing rates with longer travel times. Our data therefore do not endorse the idea that travel times influence baseline neuronal firing rates in ACC.
DISCUSSION
Choosing when to leave a depleting resource patch is a ubiquitous natural decision problem that is central to foraging theory and behavioral ecology 2, 3 . Although the brains of animals have undoubtedly been shaped by evolutionary pressures for foraging efficiency, the neural processes that mediate the simple decision to give up on one patch and move to another remain obscure. Our findings suggest that, during foraging, the primate brain computes a decision variable whose magnitude corresponds to the relative value of leaving a patch, that this value rises to a threshold associated with patch leaving, and that travel time between patches governs both the threshold and the rate at which this decision variable rises. This decision variable is represented in the firing rates of neurons in the dACC, a frontal lobe structure associated with reward monitoring and behavioral adjustment [14] [15] [16] .
If the thresholding process that we propose were to occur at the level of dACC or its inputs, we would expect to see the outcome of the threshold process in the responses of dACC neurons. Instead, we observed a signal that varied continuously with time in patch, suggesting that the thresholding process occurs downstream of dACC, perhaps in FEFs or some other premotor structure. Notably, our results imply that a downstream neuron cannot judge whether it is time to leave the patch solely by querying the output of dACC; it needs to have information about travel time, likely in the form of the change in its threshold. We speculate that such control may be implemented through neuromodulatory inputs to the dACC, perhaps via dopamine or norepinephrine 36, 37 .
Responses of dACC neurons do not uniquely represent any single variable in the MVT equations. The MVT is a description of foraging behavior at the computational level, whereas our data support a particular mechanism by which the decision process could be implemented 38 . Thus, although we claim that our hypothesized decision variable encodes the relative value of leaving a patch, we could just as easily argue that it encodes the negative value of staying (indeed, this would be consistent with error-related theories of ACC function 16 ). Because these functional mechanisms resemble those known to support basic perceptual and mnemonic decisions [10] [11] [12] [13] 34 , our findings endorse the idea that the brain uses a small suite of common mechanisms to solve diverse problems in multiple domains.
The broad applicability of the MVT to such a wide array of organisms underscores the fact that dACC is unlikely to be the sole neural locus of the decision process, even in organisms with brains similar to ours. Indeed, these mechanisms may not even be limited to brains. Many organisms that lack brains, including amoebas, slime molds and plants, exhibit behavior that is consistent with the MVT 6, 39, 40 . We conjecture that such organisms solve the patchy foraging problem in much the same way that monkeys do, namely by maintaining and a r t I C l e S controlling a representation of the relative value of leaving a patch. Thus, diverse organisms may solve common problems using similar algorithms that are implemented very differently 38 . Even in organisms with brains similar to ours, given the high redundancy of decision signals across brain areas in primates 41 , we predict that similar signals might be observed in other regions, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral intraparietal area and posterior cingulate cortex, although such signals might be convolved with other information such as target location or movement metrics.
Relation to previous studies Our findings are broadly consistent with prior studies showing that dACC monitors reward information from many sources and signals the need to adjust behavior in some manner 17, 18, 22, 23, [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] . Our results corroborate these earlier results and extend them in four important ways. First, we found that dACC responses vary continuously with the extent to which circumstances favor the decision to move on, even if leaving does not occur. This observation supports the idea that dACC neurons represent a scalar decision variable reflecting the relative value of leaving. The relative value of switching behavior was not manipulated in a previous study in which all non-switch trials were, in all important respects, the same 23 . Second, we found and measured a specific threshold at which leaving, and by extension switching, occurs. Third, we identified two mechanisms by which exogenous factors govern patchleaving behavior. Finally, we found that neuronal activity in dACC promotes disengagement in a relatively natural task that is directly modeled on real-world foraging situations. These results directly link dACC neuronal activity to behavior in a naturalistic context and may extend to situations outside the laboratory in which dACC dysfunction has been implicated, including addiction, depression, obsessivecompulsive disorder and Tourette syndrome [25] [26] [27] .
At first glance, our results appear to contradict those obtained by an earlier study that reported increasing firing rates of dACC neurons with increasing proximity to reward 24 , whereas we found increasing firing rates in anticipation of sequentially smaller rewards. We believe that the two sets of findings are fully concordant. In our study, firing rates rose as the monkey approached the decision to abandon the current patch for a new one. In the earlier study, firing rates increased as the monkey neared the rewarded action. In both cases, firing rates of dACC neurons marked progression through a sequence of actions toward a salient behavioral event: the reward in their task, patchleaving in ours. Together, our results suggest a broader view, namely that dACC neurons do not signal reward value per se, but rather that their responses encode an abstract decision variable that is suitable for guiding a variety of different modifications in behavior, whether generated endogenously or exogenously.
Our findings may also initially appear to contradict results from our earlier studies of dACC neurons 21, 22 . Previously, we found that the firing rates of dACC neurons reflected both real and fictive rewards, and generally did so with higher firing rates for larger rewards 22 . In that study, however, large rewards, both real and fictive, promoted a behavioral strategy that led to potentially larger rewards. Indeed, trial-to-trial variations in firing rate in that study positively covaried with likelihood of adjusting behavior on the next trial. In other words, higher firing rates in both studies predicted the likelihood that the monkey would successfully incorporate new information about the world into an ongoing decision to change behavior.
In another study, we found that neuronal activity in dACC showed weak, but significant, selectivity for saccade direction, in addition to anticipated real and fictive reward size 21 . In contrast, here we found no evidence for spatial selectivity in neuronal responses. These differences likely reflect task design. We used eight targets in the previous study, but only two saccade targets here, thus weakening our sensitivity to spatial selectivity, especially bimodal tuning common in dACC 21 . Also, the task used in the prior study demanded that monkeys carefully distinguish adjacent, physically similar targets to evaluate the associated reward outcomes, whereas the two targets were widely separated and physically distinct in the current study. We hypothesize that the greater demand for attentional resources associated with spatial locations in that task accentuated spatial tuning in the earlier study.
Conclusion
Our virtual foraging task is an ersatz idealization of a real patchy foraging environment. Given that foraging often involves physical effort, these results are only a first step on the path to understanding real foraging decisions. Because of the clear links between ACC function and effortful choices, dACC seems particularly well positioned to guide real-world foraging choices and is likely involved in these choices. Thus, we believe that our results provide a useful advance toward understanding natural value-based decisions and forge a critical link between systems neurobiology and behavioral ecology.
Animals' bodies are have evolved to efficiently exploit the resources in their environments. Natural selection has also acted on the nervous systems of these animals to enable the adaptive action of their bodies. Few studies have linked neural computations to specific types of naturally occurring foraging decisions. Our study portends a more general understanding of prey selection, diet selection and more complex foraging problems 3, 47 . Ultimately, these results endorse the unification of theoretical and experimental work in the ecological and neural sciences 48 .
METhODS
Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper at http://www.nature.com/natureneuroscience/.
Note: Supplementary information is available on the Nature Neuroscience website.
